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Online commerce has grown significantly and securing this channel of commerce is of vital importance for organisations. 
In the quest to secure the online world, users are often referred to as the weakest link in online security since their 
behaviour could impact negatively on systems security. User education and awareness programmes to develop and 
enhance the required skills and appropriate frame of mind are common approaches to improve online security. 
Focussing on the drivers of change in user's online security behaviour can assist in defining appropriate interventions. 
Key human behaviour models where used to define these drivers. The drivers of change in online security behaviour was 
used to design an instrument used to survey South African online consumers to determine the prevalence, or not, of 
factors that determine secure or unsecure behaviour. 
The data from the survey was analysed to highlight the Knowledge, Capability and Motivation to behave in a secure 
manner, as well as test for potential aspects that have influenced past behaviour and that could potentially influence 
future behaviour. Based on the determinants of behaviour, as well as identified deficiencies in password behaviour as 
identified by the survey, a list of potential considerations for the designers ofiS security interventions is presented. 
Introduction 
Securing information systems 
Ensuring that information is only made available to or 
disclosed to authorised individuals, entities, systems or 
processes forms part of information security. User 
identification and authentication, through systems such as 
passwords, remains the most common method used to 
control access and ensure confidentiality and availability 
(Furnell, Dowland, Illingworth & Reynolds, 2000:529) and 
remains central to information security. 
Zviran and Hag a ( 1999: 164) remark that almost every 
penetration of a computer system at some stage relies on the 
attacker 's ability to compromise a password. Attacks to 
hack, crack or discover passwords, which in turn can be 
used to gain unauthorised access to accounts and systems, 
are common. After initially addressing the passwords 
vulnerability challenge with more complex technology, 
researchers began to acknowledge that Information Systems 
(IS) security involves both people and technology (Sasse, 
Brostoff & Weirich, 2001: 122). 
A lack of knowledge among users was identified by Kortjan 
and Von Solms (201 4: 1) as a factor that contributes to 
unsafe password behaviour. If users do not apply proper 
practices when selecting and safeguarding passwords, those 
passwords are more vulnerable, which directly affect 
computer security (Gehringer, 2002:369). The actions of 
users that weakens online security through poor password 
practices, led researchers to refer to the users as the 'weakest 
link' in the information security chain (Tam, Glassman & 
Vandenwauver, 2010:233; Notoatmodjo & Thomborson, 
2009:71 ). 
After researchers initially suggested security education, 
training and awareness programs to improve password 
performance among computer users (Conklin, Dietrich & 
Walz, 2004:5), Pfleeger and Caputo (201 2) highlighted the 
need for a greater understanding of the password behaviour 
of users when designing these programs to prevent them 
from being the weak link in systems security. 
Charoen, Raman and Olfrnan (2008: 69) described how the 
appropriate interventions could have a positive effect on 
user behaviour. Through a set of tailored action research 
interventions they were able to " .. .improve system users' 
behavior related to passwords" (Charoen et al. , 2008:55). 
However, referring to online users as the weakest link is 
flawed. It is the point of departure of this paper that the 
user's behaviour, instead of the user , represents the weakest 
link in information security. This subtle yet important 
distinction shifts the emphasis for securing systems from the 
user , representing the problem that needs to be addressed, to 
the user 's behaviour that can, and should, be (positively) 
influenced to improve online security. 
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Research problem and objective 
Although researchers suggest a greater llllderstanding of the 
behaviour of users, it is not evident from the literature 
whether existing security and awareness programs focus on 
the appropriate aspects of human behaviour, indicating that 
the design of these programmes leave a lot to be desired. In 
fact Leach (2003:685) believes that ... "security awareness 
programmes often seem more likely to put users to sleep 
than to improve their behaviour". It is therefore necessaJ.y to 
design programmes that address the factors that shape users' 
behaviour and also ensure that these programmes keep users 
engaged. 
Sasse, Brostoff and Weirich (200 1: 122) recommend that 
system designers identify the underlying causes for poor 
user behaviour and address these issues to improve 
computer security. Research has shown a 'strong and 
consistent' as well as a theoretically grounded relationship 
between users' intentions and actual behaviour (Anderson & 
Agarwal, 2010:614). In order to shift the emphasis from the 
user to the user 's behaviour it is important to review current 
theoretical constructs which deal with user behaviour, or the 
then user 's intent to behave, to establish the factors that 
influence human behaviour. By shifting the emphasis to the 
determinants of secure password behaviour, the common 
mitigation measure of 'education and awaJ.·eness' can be 
optimally directed at the areas that could have the greatest 
effect on the user 's behaviour for the effort exerted. 
The purpose of this study is to: 
1. Review potential theories in human behaviour that 
could assist in developing sustainable intervention to 
improve online security. 
2. Develop an instrument to survey online consumers to 
determine their relative performance in factors that 
affect password behaviour. 
3. Analyse respondents' measured and reported password 
practices to assist practitioners to design appropriate 
measures to improve password performance. 
Literature Review 
Information system security and user behaviour 
Information security includes three main dimensions: 
confidentiality, availability and integrity (ISOIIEC, 
2014:13). One of the aims of information security is to 
ensure that information is only made available to or 
disclosed to authorised individuals, entities, systems or 
processes. This can be achieved through the implementation 
of suitable access controls, such as password systems, which 
identifY and authenticate users to prevent unauthorised 
access. Passwords remain a commonly used, cost effective 
and efficient method to identifY and authenticate computer 
users (Campbell, Kleeman & Ma, 2007:2). 
Stallings (1995:213) describes the use of a password system 
as "the front line of defence against intruders". The principle 
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behind password-based security is that an authorized 
computer user selects and remembers a secret (the 
password) and that this secret in turn is used to identifY and 
authenticate the identity of the authorized when access is 
requested (Conklin et al. , 2004:1). Due to the role that the 
user plays in ensuring the effectiveness of a password-
security system and the risks and consequences associated 
with the improper selection and use of passwords, it is 
essential that all users llllderstand the risks associated with 
the use of IS, including the consequences of applying 
improper practices (Kritzinger & Von Solms, 2010: 840). 
The first step in a password-based authentication system is 
that users select passwords that are 'strong', yet memorable 
(Conklin et al., 2004:5). However, users rarely choose 
passwords that are both hard to guess and easy to remember 
as they are confronted with a 'security-convenience trade-
off' (Tam et al., 20 10:242) in spite of users' knowledge of 
proper password practices (Weber, Guster, Safanov & 
Schmidt, 2008:46). A possible reason can be that the users 
suffer from 'password overload' which Notoatmodjo and 
Thomborson (2009:71) identified as a major contributor to 
unsafe password practices. In addition, users often perceive 
security measures as 'obstacles' and secondary to the 
primary task that they are trying to achieve, resulting in 
users who 'ignore or even subvert the security ' (Pfleeger & 
Caputo, 2012:602). Even the most sophisticated security 
systems are rendered vulnerable if computer users do not 
choose and manage their passwords properly (Tam et al., 
2010:233). 
Authors have also commented on the importance of a 
security culture within organisations and the 
interdependency of awareness programmes and a culture of 
security. According to Drevin, Kruger and Steyn (2007:36), 
a "strong ICT security culture cannot develop and grow in a 
company without awareness programmes". Their work 
emphasized the importance of users accepting responsibility 
for actions performed. Da Veiga and Eloff (20 1 0: 196) 
designed an assessment instrument to measure the maturity 
of this IS security culture within an organisation. Van 
Niekerk and Von Solms (2010:476) stated that it "has 
become widely accepted that the establishment of an 
organizational sub-culture of information security is key to 
managing the human factors involved in information 
security". 
According to Pfleeger and Caputo (2012:597) a key element 
to improve security is "acknowledging the importance of 
human behaviour when designing, building and using cyber 
security technology". When the usability (from a user 
perspective) is neglected by designers of technology, it leads 
to increased pressure on the users to enforce security 
(Brostoff & Sasse, 2002:41 ) . Researchers (Purnell, Jusoh & 
Katsabas, 2006:27; Purnell, Bryant & Phippen, 2007:416) 
recommend improving the usability of security features as 
users often don't apply these features because they have 
problems to find, understand and use these security features. 
lnglesant and Sasse (2010) advise greater emphasis on 
human computer interface (HCI) principles to increase the 
usefulness and effectiveness of password security. 
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Theoretical frameworks of human behaviour 
Although comnonly used theories in IS such as the 
Teclmology Acceptance M odel ('TAM). Dil'fusion of 
Innovation (DOl), Inform4tion l'roeessing Theory (lPT) ani 
the Delone and McLean's IS &UOet$$ model "Wttt reviewed, 
they did mt eonll'ibute direcdy towards the r=rcll 
objective. The theorttieat eonsllUcts presented in this 
seetim are It$$ common, although not completely absent, in 
IS research, llll v.tte found to be more applicable tOIVards 
designing inrenremons that mape human behaW!ur, and 
ulrimately inyrnve online security 
Socio-technical Theory 
The Soeio-technieal Theory (STT) was born rut of researeh 
conducted inro implementation problems experienced with 
the introduerion of technology which is olten met with 
resistance by users and as a result fail to achieve the 
expected benefits. STI researchers, mainly from 
behavioural sciences, suggesr that a itt between the technical 
sub -system and the social subsystem is required. The 
technical subsystem corrprises the devices, tnols and 
techniques, while the social subsystem COlqlrises the 
employees and the knowledge, skills, attitudes, values and 
needs they bring to the work environment, as well as the 
rewan:l system and authority sttuctures that exist within the 
organizatio n (Davis, Challenger, Jayewardene & Clegg, 
2014:172). 
One of the first applications of the STI principles in IS was 
the work ofBostrom and Heinen (1977: 11-28) that provided 
new insights on management information systems problems 
and failures. An IS development methodology on socio-
teclmical principles, called ETHICS, was also designed by 
Mumford (1995). Clegg's work brought STI into the online 
domain by outining the way in which soeio-technical 
prirciples can be implemented to encompass the impact of 
the inremet (CitAA. 2000). Although not as omnipresent as 
some of the rmre '\\ell-known IS theories, S1T seetm to 
enjoy growth in the IS security domain where discourse 
eoneerning the HCI remans active 
The cornerstone of the socio-teclmical approadt il that a iii 
should be adrieved by a design process aiming at the joizt 
optimisation of the subsystems, i e. any organisational 
system will maximise performance only if the 
interdependency of subsystems is exptici!ty recognised 
Hence any designer must seek out the ~ct each 
subsystem has on the other and aim to achieve superior 
results by ensuring that an the subsystems are working in 
harmony (Chern., 1976 as cited by Davis el a/, 2014:173). 
This principle is well-established in the IS security domain 
where the TAM, for example, includes 'Ease of Use' as a 
key atll'ibute rowards technology adoption, as wen as in IS 
security research 'Where the mality of the system's controls 
and the user's ability determine the attained level of 
security. 
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Theory of Planned Behaviour 
The Theory of Planned Behaviour ('TPB) is a popular 
theoretical model used tD deal with user behaviour, or rather 
the intent to behave in a ~liar manner (Ajun, 1991) 
The premises of the TPB, namely that there are different 
aspects that inlluence behaviour (m this instance password 
perfonnance), finds substantive support in the '= 
Figure 1: Theory ofPlanned :Behaviour 
Source: Aj%.en (1991) 
-
The TPB suggests that the inrenrion to perform different 
behaviours can be predicted from Attitudes towards 
behaviour, Subjective nonns and Perceived behavioural 
centro/ (refer Figure 1). k eording to Ajun ( 1991) these 
intentions aecount for a considerable arnoun of variance in 
the actual behaviour. After recent calls (Snielxltta, Presseau 
& Ar.n1jo-Soares, 2014:1-7) for the TPB robe rejected by 
the academic community, Ajzen (2014) supplied an 
excellent rebuttal pointing to the massive conll'iburion of 
researeh using the TPB over more than two decades. The 
TPB have been used extensively in IS research to study 
information seruriry policy COJI¥lliance (Bu-cu. Cavusogtu 
& Benbasat, 2010:523-548), privacy in the digital age 
(Belanger & Crosster, 2011:1017) and predicting the 
adoption of online pro=ent adoption (Aboelmaged, 
2010:392). 
Although these bet;efs an inlluence the iiuntion to perfonn 
certain actions (behaviours), the large majority of the 
existing lterature in the IS i.eld, such as many studies on 
the teehnoi<lgy a cceptance model (TAM). has focused 
mostly on investigating attitude and its anrecedera 
(behavioural bet;efs) because these belie~ can be reshaped 
by external interventions (m the form of obj ective 
information concerning information technologies and their 
desigij) to influence those behavioural beliefs and, in tum. 
improve attitude toward behaviour (Wixom & Todd, 2005) 
The focus on Attitude towards behaviour is significant in the 
context of this study since the user's outcome believe 
largely shapes their attitude towards their password selection 
and management. Whether a user feels secure or are 
concerned about a possible security breach, would largely 
shape their behaviour (negatively). The risk or value 
associated with the site being visited also plays a role in 
attitude, as well as the useiS' perception of potential positive 
or negative consequences associated with their action. 
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Subjective norms are what the user believes how others 
would view their behaviour. Selecting and managing a 
password is not done in a social context and very rarely sees 
any social interaction. This has, potentially, a rather low 
impact on user behaviour for online authentication since the 
authentication is not observed by other stakeholders. 
However, this could be changed by educational 
interventions. A mere discussion between users of varying 
levels of security awareness, rather than the facilitator's 
attempt to increase knowledge, could impact the subjective 
norms and shape user behaviour. 
Perceived behavioural control stems from self-efficacy 
theory and describes a person's judgment about being able to 
perform a particular activity - the 'I can' or ' I cannot' 
belief. Unlike self-esteem, which reflects self-worth or 
value, self-efficacy reflects how confident an individual is 
about performing specific tasks. It can be seen as the ability 
to persist or a person's ability to succeed with a task. With 
online passwords past successes or failures in meeting 
system enforced complexity measures could dramatically 
impact a user's current behaviour. By creating interventions 
that allow users to build their 'I can' belief in creating strong 
passwords, or even remembering strong passwords, the 
user 's behaviour could be positively influenced over time. 
Although the TPB is not necessarily appropriate to 
determine the behavioural performance it is valuable to use 
as a model to design interventions to improve password 
performance. According to Hardeman, Johnston, Johnston, 
Bonetti, Wareham and Kinmonth (2002:123) the TPB have 
potential for developing behavioural change interventions. 
Their research reviewed studies applying the TPB to 
behavioural change interventions and identified 24 distinct 
interventions, of which two-thirds were effective in 
changing behaviour. However, evidence supporting 
mediation by TPB components (Figure 1) was sparse. 
The Rational Choice Theory 
Rational Choice Theory (RCT) is a neo-classical economic 
approach that offers an explanation for decisions made by 
individuals when faced with choices. According to RCT 
individuals determine how they will act by balancing the 
costs and benefits of the options presented (Dowding, 2010). 
Because of its parsimonious explanation the RCT has been 
widely used to study individual, social and economic 
behaviours in various contexts, including IS (Li, Zhang & 
Sarathy, 2010; Vance & Siponen, 2012). 
In rational decision making, an individual first recognizes 
alternative courses of action (Paternoster & Pogarsky, 2009) 
and then contemplates the likely outcomes of each course of 
action. Outcomes refer to states of the system after an action 
is taken. The work of Tam et al. (2010:235) elaborates on 
the Convenience versus Security trade-off and provides a 
clear application of the RCT in shaping the behaviour of 
online users. Although models used in RCT are diverse, all 
assume that individuals choose the best action according to 
personal utility and outcome believes. Proponents of rational 
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choice models do not claim that a model's assumptions are a 
full description of reality, only that good or bad models can 
aid reasoning and assist in formulating falsifiable 
hypothesis, whether intuitive or not. 
The RCT provides some guidance in terms of measuring 
secure behaviour, since the rational process of selecting the 
outcome that maximizes personal advantage could be used 
in an instrument to test whether users correctly identify the 
option that maximizes personal advantage, for example to 
distinguish between different password options presented 
and asked to select the most secure (best) password. 
Secondly, in defining appropriate actions it is important to 
focus on the user's personal value maximization, that is, the 
framing of the outcome should be addressed and lasting 
interventions will shape the state of the possible outcomes as 
a mechanism to change behaviour. 
Heider's detenninants of perfonnance 
McCloy, Campbell and Cudeck (1994:493) stated that users 
differ in their password performance as their behaviour is 
influenced by a number of aspects. According to Heider 
(1958) an individual's performance in a particular task is a 
function of the individual 's ability and motivation relating to 
that task: 
Performance = Ability x Motivation 
Ability refers to the knowledge, skills and competencies that 
enable a human to perform a particular task. It is associated 
with what people know and think, what they can do and how 
they behave because of how they feel. Aspects that can 
influence a user's ability include their personality, prior 
education as well as previous experience (Anderson & 
Butzin, 1974:598). According to Anderson and Butzin 
(1974:599) Motivation refers to the underlying drive behind 
a user's particular behaviour in performing that task. The 
user's desire to extend effort, the intensity of the effort, as 
well as the commitment in extending effort, all impact 
motivation. 
Clearly both the Ability and Motivation dimension of 
Heider 's function is aligned with perceived behavioural 
control, or self-efficacy. Although there is a degree of 
alignment between TPB and Heider's model they serve 
different purposes. The TPB is aimed at listing factors that 
impact potential behaviour, whereas Heider 's model is 
concerned with performance, i.e. displayed behaviour. In 
line with the objective of the research the concept of 
displayed behaviour, as per Heider 's model, is used for 
further dissection. 
McCloy's function for performance 
McCloy et al. (1994) extended Heider's work by further 
refining the concept of Ability, taking cognisance of the 
difference between know-how and displaying l-'71ow-how 
through application. According to McCloy et al. Ability can 
be divided into declarative knowledge (DK) (a function of 
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the knowledge of facts, rules, principles and procedures 
relating to a task); and procedural knowledge and skill 
(PKS) (the capability when DK is successfully combined 
with knowing how and being able to perform that task). 
Heider's function for performance was thus refined as 
consisting of Declarative knowledge (DK), Procedural 
knowledge and skill (PKS) and Motivation (M): 
Performance= f (DK, PKS, M) 
It is not the objective of this research to determine the 
moderating effect of each of these aspects on password 
performance, but rather to determine if there are measurable 
deficiencies in each of these components among users and 
then to define appropriate interventions to address this to 
improve the password performance. 
Password performance model 
It was decided to use the above function for performance to 
design an instrument that can test users' levels within each 
of the three areas that can have the potential to impact 
password performance. Three determinants of a user's 
password performance were defined: 
• Knowledge (K): the user's knowledge and education 
relating to password practices; 
• Capability (C): the user's competence to successfully 
combine password-related knowledge with knowing 
how and being able to apply proper password 
practices; 
• Motivation (M): the underlying desire behind the 
user's password behaviour. 
This construct for the determinants of password 
performance represents an opportunity to deconstruct poor 
password performance in a way different to most research to 
date. If the reasons why users do not apply proper password 
practices are known, then appropriate methods aimed at 
addressing the underlying causes for poor password 
behaviour can be designed and implemented to improve 
password security. 
In addition to testing the attributes that impact behaviour 
through this study an opportunity also existed to gather 
information about factors that lead to past changes in 
behaviour as well as potential future behaviour changes 
among users. These factors were used to determine Drivers 
for change (D) and can be used to determine if the 
password performance model indeed describes the drivers of 
change by correlating the factors that lead to behavioural 
change to Knowledge, Capability and Motivation. 
Research Methodology 
Research Design 
A survey was used to determine users' current performance 
in each of the three key areas of password performance. 
Survey designs are appropriate when researching behaviour. 
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A survey consists of a predetermined set of questions that is 
given to a representative(s) of the larger population of 
interest (Shaughnessy, Zechmeister & Jeanne, 2011). The 
survey designed also used an online platform, when given 
the nature of what is being researched (behaviour of online 
users), was deemed appropriate for this study. 
Research instrument 
A new research instrument was created for the survey that 
tested four different elements: 
• Knowledge (K); 
• Capability (C); 
• Motivation to behave securely (M); 
• Self-reported drivers of change (D). 
The respondents' Knowledge (K) was tested in the 
questionnaire by means of a set of questions that tested their 
'know-what' of strong and secure passwords as well as good 
management practices in terms of safekeeping and regularly 
changing passwords. 
The respondents' Capability (C) was tested by asking them 
to rank different combinations of passwords from the most 
to the least secure, testing 'know-how'. In ranking the 
passwords they displayed their ability to understand and 
combine factors such as password length, complexity, 
different character sets, as well as common words. 
Respondents were also asked about the sharing of passwords 
and when they last changed their passwords to obtain an 
indication of practice, i.e. knowing about regular changes 
constitute Knowledge, having changed the password in the 
last 12 months constitutes Capability. 
It is acknowledged that research in the field of Motivation 
(M) is highly complex and best left to experienced 
researchers in this domain. However, a simple well-known 
trade-off in terms of security and convenience when users 
choose and manage passwords provided a good indication of 
their underlying motivation. Respondents were tested about 
prioritising security and it was decided that security as a top 
priority is an acceptable predictor of motivation to behave 
securely. A set of questions probed users' propensity to 
behave either with convenience or security as the most 
important factor. 
As Drivers of change (D) respondents were asked to select 
from past experiences that have led to a change in password 
(reality) and potential future events that will lead to changes 
(reported perception). Respondents were also provided with 
an optional open-ended question prompting for other 
triggers that will potentially drive a change in password 
behaviour. 
The survey contained 43 questions, both structured and 
open-ended. It was designed and refined via two iterations 
of pilot testing with a group selected to range from computer 
novices to online experts. Users validating the survey were 
asked to highlight any questions that forced answers and 
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also indicate an ambiguity in the question set. A third round 
of testing revealed no issues with the question set after 
incorporating all user feedback 
Data gathering and analysis 
The survey was distributed via email to a database of online 
South African users from the author's tertiary institution. 
This distribution list consisted of just below 10 000 email 
addresses on the gnduate school's contact list. lt was also 
distributed via snowball method by the researcher 
specifically, targeting the underrepresented areas of younger 
(pre-employment) and older (post-erq>loyment) internet 
users. A review of the survey demognphics revealed a 
slight bias in terms of educational levels v.hen compared 
with the online population, but no significant bias in terms 
of age and gender distribution 
ln order to put users who miJ!ht fear that 1hey may be 
required to share potentially sensitive infonnation at ease, 
care was taken to ensure respondents that their passwords 
would not be asked, and that the ptupose of the study ·was to 
merely gather information on the practices that users apply, 
not passwords. 
Use.s • pereeptions about 1heir password practices· 
knowledge and application as welt as motivation were 
analysed using descriptive statistics. Based on 1he responses 
a measured ability for the respondents· Knowledge, 
Capability and ;\1otivation ·was calculated. A textual analysis 
of the open-ended q).testions was done by coding the text 
with recurring themes that emerged from the answers. 
Sam pie size and response rate 
For a population of > 1 mit (SA internet use IS) and a 
conf.:ience interval of 99% a sarq>le population of at least 
384 responses is required. Although no inferential statistics 
·witt be used, the sarq> le population indeed met this 
minimum criterion. There were a total 794 responses to the 
survey, but as only respondents that use online banking was 
included in the fmat sample, the dataset consisted of 737 
valid and complete responses. 
Limitations of the research 
lt is acknowledged by the author that certain limitations 
exist due to the methods employed. The distribution of the 
email to the graduate school's database and pe.sonat 
contacts do present and element of bias. Although 
comparisons with the general online population only 
indicated an element of bias in terms of educational levels, it 
is not an ideal sample. 
Due to the defmition of Knowledge (Know what) and 
Capability (Know how) there is a moderating effect of 
Knowkdge on Copahility. lt is rather difficult to apply 
without knowing and it is to be expected that a large degree 
of the variation in capability could be explained by the 
variation in knowledge. 
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The challenge of reported verS<lS actual bchavio\lr is welt 
documented in survey researeh The value of data depends 
upon how truthful respondents are in their answe.s and since 
they know that their responses are being recorded and 
analysed, they may feet pressured to respond to questions in 
a certain way, the so-catted social desirability. The survey 
design took cognisance of this by ensuring anonymity and 
requesting that respondents indicate current and past 
behaviour, irrespective of their view on 1he desirability, or 
not, of said behaviour. 
Data Analyses and Results 
Knowledge, capability and motivation 
The responses were analysed to determine the levels of 
Knowledge, Capability and Motivation, independently for 
each respondent. Figure 2 provides a frequency distribution 
of the analyses. 
Knowtedse, capability and Motivation levels 
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Figore Z: Knowledge, capability and motivation of 
respondents 
When analysing the Knowledge of the 737 respondents, 55 
respondents (7,5%) pereeived that they possess absolute 
knowledge of password practices. However, a mere 9 
respondents (1,2%) demonstrated flawless Capability to 
apply proper password practices. Only 27 ('3,7%) displayed 
a perfect 'security fust' aptitude when selecting and 
managing passwords indicating perfect security conscious 
Motl'vation. 
Table 1 indicates the average measured ability for all three 
attributes of the password performance model as welt as the 
standard deviation. 
Table 1: Respondent performance variation (n =131) 
Attribute Knowleda!e CaoabUitv Motivation 
Mean 0.69 0.72 0.71 
Standard 0.136 0.136 0.152 
deviation(«) 
Although the means for Knowledge and Capability are 
slightly different, the variations are the same, tending some 
support for the potential moderation effect of Knowledge on 
Capability. 
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The good, the bad and the ugly 
The anaty.sis .m>ggests that aU three factors (Knowledge, 
Capability and Motivation) contribute to poor password 
practices among So\.ih African online consumern. For 
further anaty.sis levels of proficiency in each of these 
domains were defmed as indicated below: 
• E:xcdlent Higher than 80'h; 
• Good: BetWeen 65% and 80'h; 
• Average: BetWeen SO'h and 64%; 
• l'oor. Les. than SO'h. 
..,. 
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""' 
.... 
-
-
-... 
""' 
.... 
... 
Knowledge, Cap<oblllty and M otivation levels 
·-- ......... 
Flg\lr~ 3: Cat~gorif~d performa:nc& 
........ 
.,. 
The anaty.sis of the responses in these different criteria is 
shown in Figure 3 . More users ('33.4% as opposed bl 21.4% 
and 26.6%) are classified as being wen -motivated using the 
defmed bins. However, it is evident from Table 1 that there 
is a higher variance in Motivation ( o • 0.152) than either 
Knowledge or Capability. A higher variation could indicate 
a potential to (positivelY) inftuenee the Motivation bl behave 
serurety. 
The anaty.sis indieates the presence of all tlree facblrs 
eontriluting to poor password behaviour amongst the 
respondents. Although the Motivdion levels are slightly 
better than those for Knowledge and Capability, all three 
faetors remain problematic and are thus drivers of poor 
password performance among South African m line 
eon.m>mers. 
Drivers of change 
It is evident &om the responses that there are certain past 
and future experiences that affect certain users' motivation 
to Uq>rove password practices. :Responses about past 
experiences that wilt trigger a positive (more secure) 
behavioural change are provided in Table 2. The question 
was phrased specif.eatty to ask about a password change 
(measurable) rather than a more desirable behavioural 
change, since that would constitute a perceived change. 
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Tabl~ Z: l'ast exp~rlenc~ that trlgg~M a cha:ng~ 
Resulted Did not J>o.sltlv~ Event in result in 
chanj.e chan2e cllan&eln 
Learned that my current Knowl~dgo 
password was not very 47.3% 527% k 
serure fn 205! Capability 
Am aware of !he need to Knowl~dgo 
regularly change my 32.9% 67.1% k 
d fn 501l C.pabil ity 
& ... persooally suffered a 
secnriiv breoch. (n 93) 87.1% 129% MooVOlion 
Learned about bad 
experiences from friends, 30.9% 69.1% MooVOlion ~ly or rolleogues (n 
285 
Becam-e awar-e of s-ecurity 
br~ches in the media (n 25.1% 74.9% Motivation 
485 
Of particular interest in the responses about driv~s of 
chang~ is: 
• The poor reaction (67.1% no action) related to lhe need 
to regularly change passwords; 
• The 12.9% of users that do not change passwords even 
after .m>ffering a security breach; 
• The low impact of media (74.9% no action) and even 
friends, colleagues and family (69.1% no action) in 
motivating users bl change passwords. Sharing tales of 
pain may be less effective than what is commonly 
believed. 
Respondents were also asked via an open-ended question to 
share past instances that lead to changes in passwords. 
These were dcrninated by forced changes .m>ch as "~n~red 
wrong three fimes" (Respondent 103), "lost card and 
renewed J>lN and Password" (Respondent 443) and similar 
evetts. One response, however, clearly stood out According 
to Respondent 2A8 "the responsibllity to msur~ the stJfe 
usage of internet banking is on the ban/c not on me. Tfmy 
acc<!U71t gets hacked, for whdewr reason. they are insur~d 
against it" This indicates a clear abdication of responsibility 
towards the instiMion and a tack of awareness of the shared 
responsinlity fur security, an aspect to be emphasized 
during awareness training. 
Table 3 contains users' perceptions about future events that 
may trigger a change in passwords. 
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Table 3: Future experiences that may potentially trigger 
password change 
Will not May Will 
Event lead to lead to definitely 
change change change 
When hearing about financial 17.8% 63.9% 18.3% losses in the media 
When hearing about financial 
losses suffered by people I 13.6% 59.2% 27.2% 
know 
Suffering_Q_ersonallosses 1.9% 5.5% 92.6% 
When requested by my 4.3% 19.1% 76.6% 
service_Q!ovider 
When I know my details 0.9% 3.0% 96.1% have been compromised 
Realising that I re-use my 
internet banking password on 11.4% 35.1% 53.4% 
other internet sites 
Realising that my current 4.7% 29.3% 65.9% password is not very secure 
When prompted about other future events that could 
potentially trigger a password change, three categories of 
responses stood out: 
• An increase in knowledge as is evident by the response 
"A better understanding of the risks involved in breaking 
my passwords" (Respondent 19) occurred in 5% of 
respondents; 
• Merely completing the survey created an increased 
awareness and "this survey" (or similar) was indicated 
by 17% of respondents, some even indicating that they 
will immediately change their passwords after 
completing the survey; 
• A personal security breach. With the exception of one 
instance of mentioning the media by Respondent 513, 
the only other option already provided in this question 
was a personal security breach. 
The survey achieved an unintended objective, namely 
imparting knowledge (according to respondents), as is 
evidenced by Respondent 527's statement "I didn't realize 
that using the same password for different unrelated 
websites is a security risk. However, I will get unique 
passwords/pins now!" The following also emerged from the 
analysis of the text: 
• Sharing of passwords: Passwords are shared with 
spouses, with some respondents indicating that divorce 
will be a reason to change passwords. 
• Password fatigue is clearly a concern for respondents 
with Respondent 137 indicating that "It is impossible to 
use passwords safely - there simply are too many for any 
human brain to remember without writing it down. And 
you have to remember the Pin, the username and the 
password!" 
• Lack of responsibility: Elements of lack of 
responsibility was evidenced with a response like "This 
survey is driving home the fact that I might want to 
change my password from time to time - HOWEVER, if it 
aint broken why fix i(i " (Respondent 41). 
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Findings and discussion 
Knowledge as a driver of behavioural change 
Purnell (2007:445) remarks that one of the reasons why 
many computer users do not apply safe password practices 
is because "they may not know any better" due to a lack of 
appropriate knowledge, guidance and support. This may 
lead to users applying unsafe practices without them even 
being aware of this. 
The survey confirmed that knowledge among users is indeed 
lacking. Nonetheless analysis of the open-ended questions 
clearly displayed the (positive) unintended initiation of a 
change in behaviour due to the knowledge (and motivation). 
A final question asked respondents to indicate if they want 
to receive guidelines on safer password practices to which 
73.2% responded positively, indicating a willingness to 
receive relevant new knowledge. Increasing knowledge 
about what constitutes a strong password is not a new 
concept in IS security interventions, far from it. However, 
the study confirms firstly a lack of knowledge and secondly 
the positive impact of imparting new knowledge. It is 
important that knowledge is not dumped in a one-size-fits-
all method. Engaging users in the process and providing 
users with relevant knowledge based on the attributes of 
their own passwords, rather than merely stating generic 
information, is important. Appropriate interventions obtain 
user engagement, is tailored to work with the users' current 
levels of knowledge and protect their privacy (which 
remains a challenge when personalizing IS security 
education). 
In addition, it is important that users' awareness be 
maintained over time. While advising against punishing 
users for poor password behaviour, if security is 
compromised and no action is taken, users may be prone to 
be less security motivated as they feel that security 'does not 
matter anyway'. Conversely, if the system and security 
measures seem invincible, users may tend to be more 
careless, since they perceive the security threat to be low. 
Capability as a driver of behavioural change 
Tarn et al. (2010) stated that although users possess the 
required knowledge, their practical application thereof often 
lacks, indicating an inability to apply the knowledge, i.e. 
they may have the 'know-what' but lack the 'know-how'. 
Nine questions in the survey required respondents to assess 
the strength of various passwords. Only 11% of respondents 
were able to rank the strength of all passwords correctly. 
When compared with the 35% of respondents who indicated 
that they 'knew exactly' what a strong password was, it is 
clear that users may not be capable to apply their knowledge 
on password practices. 
Possible reasons for respondents' incapability to apply 
proper password practices may be that users overestimate 
their perceived knowledge regarding password practices due 
to a phenomenon known as optimistic bias (Weinstein, 
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1980:806). Optimistic bias may lead password users to 
overestimate their ability to create 'strong' passwords that 
are properly managed and protected. It is thus important that 
the application of good practice forms part of the password 
education process when designing security improvement 
interventions. W ebsites such as 
howsecureismypassword.org and www.passwordmeter.com 
can assist to determine password strength and provide real-
time feedback by showing characteristics of good and poor 
passwords. Adams and Sasse (1999:44) recommend 
including online constructive feedback during the password 
construction process as a means in increase 'know-how'. 
The gamification of security practices presents another 
opportunity to improve knowledge, grow capability and get 
learner engagement. Thornton and Francia (20 14) have 
shown how gamification of IS security can have a positive 
effect on user engagement and succeed in improving their 
capabilities. Gamification is of course not without perils and 
a meta-study by Hamari, Koivisto and Sarsa (20 14) of 
previous work provides guidance on the appropriate design 
of these interventions. Importantly, gamification turns 
knowledge into capability through practical application of 
the principles. In addition, it could also show deficiencies in 
knowledge of which users may not be aware. 
Motivation as a driver of behavioural change 
An important factor that impacts negatively on motivation is 
the vast amount of password-protected systems. This is 
confirmed in the survey where 16.3% of respondents 
indicated that they need to authenticate themselves at 20 or 
more systems online. These multiple places of 
authentication, coupled with policies that impose regular 
changes in passwords, clearly intensify the strain on users' 
memories. Carstens, McCauley-Bell, Malone and DeMara 
(2004:68) have commented on the increasing number of 
password-protected systems, enforced password lifetimes 
and composition rules and the challenges that it provides for 
human memory- the 'password overload' (Notoatmodjo & 
Thomborson, 2009:71). 
Interventions aimed to motivate a user to act more securely 
need to take cognisance of this password overload. Sharing 
best practices and composition rules with users could in fact 
decrease the motivation to behave in a secure manner. When 
the security motivation is secondary to convenience it leads 
to weak password practices, which include using short and 
weak passwords that are easy to remember, sharing 
passwords, writing down passwords, re-using passwords and 
not changing passwords regularly (Y an, Blackwell, 
Anderson & Grant, 2004:25). When interventions have 
value, rather than threatening compliance, they may be more 
sustainable, in line with respondent 93 that stated "If 
something new and convenient comes up, I will certainly try 
it., 
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Recommendations 
To improve password performance one of the most common 
suggestions made by researchers is the education of 
computer users through improved security education, 
training and awareness programs (Purnell et al., 2007:417). 
It is important that initiatives to improve the IS security 
culture via education and awareness interventions focus on 
the underlying determinants of poor password performance 
evident from this study. The literature confirms that training 
programs do not necessarily address all the issues that 
should be dealt with (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010:614). 
Table 4 contains a summary of the recommendations that 
flow from the analysis performed. 
Table 4: Recommendation to improve Knowledge, 
Capability and Motivational levels 
Addresses Recommendations 
Design interaction discussions to allow peer-to-peer 
sharing of best pmctices rather than an expert 
instructing users about best practice. 
Create opportunities that show users how to remember 
strong passwords via known techniques as well as 
acceptable technologies. 
Shared responsibility is fundamental to IS security 
maturity. Design interventions to allow the expression 
Knowledge of counter arguments and allow ample time to discuss 
and dissect this option. Use analogies like the shared 
responsibility of the vehicle manufacturer and the driver 
of the vehicle to ensure safe roads. 
Use forced change interventions as an opportunity to 
improve behaviour. It is evident from the responses that 
passwords are changed when enforced by systems, 
explain the positive value in using it as an opportunity 
to improve security 
Create opportunities that allow users to build their 'I 
can' do belief in creating strong passwords by 
pmcticing their know-how in a simulated environment. 
Use the omnipresent challenge of password fatigue to 
make an emotional connection by stating that it is a 
Capability reality and will only get worse. Show users how well-
documented techniques and available technology could 
assist with the challenge. 
Users have to apply new knowledge ('know-what') in a 
safe environment and be given feedback to both create 
'know-how' and enhance self-efficacy. 
Design interventions around the principle that 
maximum personal advantage IS also the greater 
advantage - a positive outcome for all. Do not fight the 
RCT principles, rather design learning that use it. 
Use the security-convenience trade-off as an 
opportunity, not a threat, by showing techniques and 
technologies that are more convenient and more secure 
than committing to memory. 
Motivation Do not threaten users with compliance - where 
absolutely necessary this can be system enforced. 
Rather use the concept of us (user and organisation) 
versus them (cyber criminals), it should never be the 
user' s convenience versus the organisation's policies. 
Use gamification, where possible, to make the sessions 
more interactive and engaging. A simple prize for the 
strongest password on howstrongismypassword.org 
could be a fun learning experience. 
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The recommendations (Table 4) are at different levels of 
granularity and encompass principles like intervention 
design, facilitation style and education techniques. It is not 
intended to be a complete set of guidelines but merely a 
supplementary set of principles that could be used by 
practitioners and designers of security awareness 
interventions in their strive towards a secure IS 
environment. Future research could potentially focus on 
determining the value of these concepts in improving online 
security. 
Conclusion 
The value of educational programmes in improving online 
security was confirmed by the work of Bauer, Bemroider 
and Chudzikowski (2013). Kortjan and Von Solms (2014) 
have also designed a conceptual framework for cyber-
security awareness and education within South Africa that 
represents a structured approach towards dealing with this 
ongoing challenge. Al-Hamdani (201 4) highlighted the 
importance of properly designed IS security interventions 
to achieve the obj ectives of growing IS security maturity. 
The objective of the research is to contribute towards the 
appropriateness of interventions (Table 4) and it could, for 
example, be used in conjunction with Kortjan and Von 
Solms's conceptual framework 
Although a mere 27% of the respondents showed the 
appropriate knowledge levels regarding password practices, 
the results of this study indicated a willingness among 
ignorant users to improve their password practices. The 
majority expressed their willingness to obtain more 
knowledge on password-related matters. The indifference 
towards IS security may be less than what is commonly 
believed by IS security professionals as respondents to the 
survey clearly displayed a readiness to improve their 
security behaviour. This willingness of users to acquire 
knowledge suggests an opportunity for those who deftne IS 
security intervention leaming outcomes to design a process 
that addresses the drivers of behaviour as identified in this 
paper. 
By improving education and trammg programs to take 
cognisance of the determinants of password performance, 
real sustainable improvement in IS security levels is indeed 
possible. Besides sharing knowledge on secure password 
practices, password vulnerability, threats and consequences 
of violations, these programs should focus on users' ability 
to apply these practices as well as address the motivational 
issues. It is only through growing capability and dealing 
with factors that motivate behaviour that a real difference in 
IS security maturity can be achieved. 
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